Obviously there are optimization tricks being used now that would have to go out the window. If I have a crypto algorithm I wish to make more efficient than "secure" (i.e., relies on key secrecy and not algorithm secrecy, and the fastest attack is brute force) algorithms by various tricks that render it only secure if the algorithm is hidden, I could do so. But it is no longer "secure" by the full definition provided in the field of cryptography.
So, my question still stands. Your Algorithm A is broken, as you say (in fact, Yahoo worked that way in the Good Old Days, and I know of lots of people who grabbed websites like aardvark.com to exploit that attack.) "Return pages in random order" is not a search algorithm; it's a random retrieval algorithm, and furthermore, doesn't prevent an attacker from analyzing your PRNG and composing pages that are "randomly" selected by the search engine.
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Date: 2008-01-04 04:51 pm (UTC)So, my question still stands. Your Algorithm A is broken, as you say (in fact, Yahoo worked that way in the Good Old Days, and I know of lots of people who grabbed websites like aardvark.com to exploit that attack.) "Return pages in random order" is not a search algorithm; it's a random retrieval algorithm, and furthermore, doesn't prevent an attacker from analyzing your PRNG and composing pages that are "randomly" selected by the search engine.
Not seeing the proof of impossibility here.